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Social policy reform under the 







The formation of a Government of National Unity (GNU) in Zimbabwe in 2009 has 
generally been assessed as a façade, with ZANU-PF retaining real power to serve 
its own ends. Whilst this may have been true of the key challenges facing Zimbabwe 
– ensuring democratic political competition and the rule of law, and (less clearly) 
economic stabilisation and growth – it was not true in all areas of public policy. 
With respect to social protection, the partial change of government resulted in 
significant reform. In the mid-2000s, social protection in Zimbabwe was for the 
most part limited to donor-funded and distributed emergency food aid. Under the 
GNU, ministers from the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) presided over 
more programmatic responses involving the state and donors working together, 
including on the country’s first sustained experiments with cash transfers as well as 
innovative food aid programmes. The shift in policy was not due so much to clear 
policy preferences on the part of the MDC as to the transformed relations between 
MDC-controlled government ministries and donors and international agencies. The 
MDC opened the policy reform door to donors and agencies that were enthusiastic 
about cash transfer and reformed food aid programmes. The shift to cash transfers 
was also made possible by dollarisation and market liberalisation. Whereas 
Zimbabwe had been very anomalous in terms of its pro-poor policies in 2009, by 
2013 its policies were far closer to those of its neighbours, although they remained 





Competitive multi-party elections became the norm across most of Southern Africa 
(excepting Swaziland) in the 1990s, but in only 20 percent of elections have they 
resulted in changes of government: Zambia in 1991 (when the opposition 
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) led by Frederick Chiluba ousted 






long-time incumbent president Kenneth Kaunda and his United National 
Independent Party), and again in 2011 (when Michael Sata and the Patriotic Front 
finally ousted the MMD); Malawi in 1994 (when the long-term incumbent 
president, Hastings Kamuzu Banda and his Malawi Congress Party were ousted by 
Bakili Muluzi and the United Democratic Front) and again in 2014 when Peter 
Mutharika defeated Joyce Banda; Lesotho in 2012, when Tom Thabane formed a 
coalition government to oust Pakalitha Mosisili; the first inclusive elections in 
Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, won by the Zimbabwe African National 
Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), the South-West African People’s Organisation 
(SWAPO) and the African National Congress (ANC) respectively; and the 2008 
and 2013 elections in Zimbabwe, which resulted in the establishment and then 
dissolution of a coalition government that included the former opposition 
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).1 None of the ANC, SWAPO, Frelimo 
in Mozambique, the Botswana Democratic Party or the Movimento Popular de 
Libertação de Angola have yet lost a national election. Across Southern Africa, 
incumbent presidents and parties tend to retain power for long periods. 
 
Zimbabwe achieved independence in 1979, held its founding democratic election in 
1980, and held further presidential or parliamentary elections in 1985, 1990, 1995, 
1996, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2013. For this entire time ZANU-PF has been in 
government. Until 2008 it had not officially lost an election, although there were 
widespread doubts about whether it really won the 2000 parliamentary elections. In 
2008, it lost the parliamentary elections and incumbent president Robert Mugabe 
was re-elected as president only when the MDC’s candidate Morgan Tsvangirai 
withdrew in the second round in the face of massive violence against the MDC. In 
2009, ZANU-PF and the two MDC factions formed a Government of National 
Unity (GNU). 
 
Bratton writes that “the so-called inclusive government of 2009-2013 was inclusive 
in name only”, and describes power-sharing as a “façade”:  
 
‘A narrow coalition of civilian and military leaders with roots in the 
country’s liberation struggle continued to turn the instruments of the state 
toward controlling elections and looting the country’s wealth. Far from 
sharing power with a democratic opposition, ZANU-PF elites sacrificed 
																																								 																				
1 In Malawi, in 2012, there was a change of government which did not result from an election 
defeat: The death of the incumbent president led to vice-president Joyce Banda becoming 
president, despite Banda no longer being a member of her predecessor’s party. 






democracy, state building, and economic development for their own 
political survival’ (2014: 29). 
 
ZANU-PF consolidated its powers of coercion and patronage, enabling it to inflict 
a “crushing defeat” on the MDC in elections in June 2013. ZANU-PF had “out-
foxed, out-organized, and out-muscled a well-meaning but inexperienced popular 
opposition movement” (ibid: 1). Bratton acknowledges that the GNU did stabilize 
the economy and improved public finances (although ZANU-PF retained sole 
control of diamond revenues). Overall, however, the MDC “failed to develop a 
coherent policy agenda”. Its inexperienced staffers “faced an entrenched and 
reluctant civil service whose officers – from permanent secretaries to gate guards – 
did their best to hamstring the newcomers” (ibid: 132). Bratton provides one 
example of reform – the distribution of agricultural inputs to small farmers as part 
of a drought mitigation scheme in 2009 – that was “hijacked” by ZANU-PF’s local 
structures (ibid: 133). Both business and civil society were disappointed by the 
MDC’s caution and inaction on important issues. 
 
Bratton’s assessment may be true overall, but it is not true with respect to social 
protection policy. Bratton himself does not consider any aspect of social policy – 
public education and health as well as social protection – which fell under 
ministries controlled by one or other MDC faction. In this paper we examine the 
transformation of social protection policy between 2009 and 2013. In 2008, 
Zimbabwe’s social protection system reflected 28 years of ZANU-PF government. 
It lagged not only very far behind the more developed systems of South Africa and 
Namibia, but also behind all of the other Anglophone countries in Southern Africa. 
Whilst Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland had by 2005 followed the lead of South 
Africa and Namibia in establishing social assistance pension programmes, and 
Zambia and Malawi were experimenting with pilot programmes, Zimbabwe made 
no programmatic provision for its poor or otherwise vulnerable citizens. More than 
in any Anglophone country, ZANU-PF governments in Zimbabwe up to 2009 
emphasised (perhaps more rhetorically than in reality) an agrarian route to poverty 
reduction – through land reform – and downplayed poverty-reducing cash transfers. 
The MDC, in contrast, presented itself as a ‘social democratic’ party, with support 
concentrated in urban constituencies that might be expected to favour an expansion 
of the welfare state. Between 2009 and 2013 MDC Ministers headed most of the 
relevant government departments (including Labour and Social Services, 
Education, Health and Finance). The MDC also had much closer links than ZANU-
PF to the international aid donors who, in the 2000s, had become enthusiastic 
champions of cash transfers. Working closely with donors and international 
agencies (including the World Food Programme, UNICEF and the World Bank), 






MDC ministers presided over a series of important programmatic reforms: public 
works programmes began to replace emergency food aid and a new Harmonised 
Social Cash Transfer programme was introduced for ‘labour-constrained’ 
households in which there were no adults fit to work. For the first time, strategic 
documents clearly acknowledged that cash transfers would form an important part 
of public policy to mitigate poverty and promote development. The design of the 
programmes and strategy reflected the important roles played by donors and 
international agencies. 
 
The comparative literature on welfare-state-building emphasises the importance of 
competitive partisan politics. Huber and Stephens argue that “partisan politics was 
the single most important factor that shaped the development of welfare states 
through time” (2001: 1, emphasis added). Welfare-state building in the advanced 
capitalist countries was largely determined by whether a country’s post-1945 
politics was dominated by a social democratic party, a Christian democratic party, 
or parties in the “secular entre and right” (ibid; see also Esping-Andersen, 1985, 
1990). The precise design of democratic institutions also mattered. In some 
countries, institutions provided incentives to parties to become more programmatic 
and less particularistic, which shaped the kind of welfare state that was built (e.g. 
Lynch, 2006). In the USA, institutional design generally impeded welfare-state 
building (Amenta, 1998; Katznelson, 2013). The role of democracy in the global 
South is less clear, in part because competitive democracy was established (or re-
established) relatively recently in many countries. In many cases, however, there is 
evidence that electoral competition fuelled policy reform, including in Brazil, India 
and Korea (Seekings, 2012). The literature on the importance of democracy or 
elections for welfare policy reform in Africa is very limited, although some studies 
of health and education outcomes suggest that democracy sometimes matters (e.g. 
Carbone, 2012; Stasavage, 2005). Munemo (2012) argues that governments in 
Southern Africa (including Zimbabwe) between the 1980s and early 2000s shifted 
between patronage-based and programmatic food aid systems according to their 
vulnerability to electoral competition. Resorting to patronage systems was a 
reflection of government or partisan weakness. Reviews of the politics of welfare 
policy reforms have been unable to go beyond speculation that elections might 
matter (Niño-Zarazúa et al., 2012; Seekings, 2013). This paper thus entails a foray 
into largely uncharted territory in understanding social policy reform in 
contemporary Africa. 
 
We show below that the participation of the MDC in government was 
consequential, but the reason for this may be surprising. Policies changed after 
2009 not so much because the MDC was a more programmatic, ‘social democratic’ 






party than ZANU-PF (although this was true), but rather because it had much better 
relations with foreign donors and opened the door to a closer partnership between 
donors and the state. Donors were generally enthusiastic about cash transfers, and 
their enthusiasm shaped public policy, which was funded almost entirely by donor 
aid. Elections enabled Zimbabwean voters to limit the power of the incumbent 
ZANU-PF, and indirectly to change public policy. One of the key characteristics of 
‘welfare regimes’ in Africa2 is the very blurred boundary between state and non-
state provision. Under the GNU, Zimbabwe became much more like other East and 
Southern African countries in this respect. 
 
 
Economic Crisis, Poverty and the Withering of 
the Zimbabwean Welfare State 
 
The formation of the GNU in Zimbabwe in 2009 marked the culmination of a 
series of events stretching back at least to 1997, when the ZANU-PF government 
awarded generous pensions and other privileges to ‘veterans’ of the liberation war 
and identified a large minority of large farms for compulsory expropriation. 
Economic crisis and discontent with ZANU-PF resulted in the formation of the 
MDC in 1999, and the defeat of the government in a referendum on constitutional 
reform in early 2000. Losing support with parliamentary elections looming, 
ZANU-PF sanctioned land occupations, mostly led by ‘war veterans’. The MDC 
officially won 57 of the 120 seats, including all urban seats and almost all seats in 
Matebeleland. Many observers criticised the elections as neither free nor fair, but 
ZANU-PF retained power. ZANU-PF continued to deploy violent intimidation and 
(allegedly) vote-rigging, with Mugabe defeating MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai in 
a presidential election in March 2002 and ZANU-PF performing strongly in 
parliamentary elections in March 2005, leading to the MDC’s boycott of elections 
to the newly established Senate in November 2005. External diplomacy was 
required to schedule presidential and parliamentary elections in March 2008. The 
MDC – which had split into two factions (MDC-T led by Tsvangirai and MDC-M 
led by Arthur Mutambara) – won a total of 110 seats in the expanded National 
Assembly (with MDC-T winning 100 and MDC-M 10), to 99 for ZANU-PF (and 
one pro-ZANU-PF independent). In the presidential election, and after a suspicious 
month-long delay, Tsvangirai officially won 48 percent of the vote to Mugabe’s 43 
percent (and a small share to an independent candidate, Simba Makoni, backed by 
																																								 																				
2 This is especially true in the Middle East also, and to a lesser extent elsewhere (Cammett & 
Maclean, 2014). 






MDC-M), necessitating a second round. In the face of massive and violent 
intimidation, Tsvangirai withdrew, allowing Mugabe to be re-elected unopposed. 
 
The elections left Mugabe as president, but without legitimacy and facing (for the 
first time) a hostile majority in the National Assembly. Negotiations, mediated by 
South African President Thabo Mbeki, led to the MDC factions and ZANU-PF 
signing, in September 2008, a ‘Global Political Agreement’ (GPA) that committed 
them to power-sharing. It proved difficult to reach agreement on the details, 
however, and the new ‘inclusive government’ was not sworn-in until February 
2009. ZANU-PF was allocated 14 ministries (including Defence, Justice, Home 
Affairs and Mining). MDC-T was allocated 13 ministries (including Finance and 
most portfolios involving service delivery) and MDC-M three (including 
Education). Both at the time and later, ZANU-PF was seen as having taken key 
portfolios leaving the MDC factions the portfolios responsible for service delivery 
without funding (Tofa, 2013: 93-4; Raftopoulos, 2013a: 89). MDC-T minister 
Gorden Moyo later said that only five of the MDC’s ministries were significant: 
“It’s only the Finance, Health, Labour, Energy and Water ministries that we had 
and the rest were like departments”.3 The MDC was unable to convert their 
electoral success into more substantial state power in the face of the “structural 
erosion and political exhaustion of its support base, particularly in urban areas”, the 
weakness of international pressures on the Mugabe/ZANU-PF regime, and 
especially the regime’s use of violence (Raftopoulos, 2010; see also Bratton, 2014). 
 
By early 2009, the Zimbabwean economy was in deep collapse (Bourne, 2011). 
The economy had shrunk in nine out of the preceding ten years. Formerly ranked as 
a ‘middle income country’ (by the World Bank), Zimbabwe’s real GDP halved 
between 1998 and 2008. By 2009 GDP per capita had fallen below 
Mozambique’s.4 Agricultural production shrank at an average rate of 10 percent 
p.a. over the decade, reported the United Nations’ World Food Programme (WFP).  
 
‘While the large-scale commercial farming sector was destroyed, 
communal farmers – who produce most of the national maize supply for 
consumption – have struggled as a result of various economic problems, 
limited availability of and access to inputs, and recurrent low rainfall. … 
																																								 																				
3 Quoted in Obey Manayiti, ‘Former MDC-T ministers were in government to make up 
numbers’, NewsDay 15th March 15 2014; https://www.newsday.co.zw/2014/03/15/former-mdc-t-
ministers-government-make-numbers/; 
4 Data from World Bank’s World Development Indicators, variables NY.GDP.MKTP.KD and 
NY.GDP.PCAP.KD. 






Once an exporter of agricultural products, including maize, Zimbabwe 
became a food-deficit country that relied on imports’ (WFP, 2012a: 2-5).  
 
Unemployment was estimated at 80 percent, despite mass emigration. The 
government’s huge budget deficit (reaching almost 100 percent of GDP in 2007) 
pushed inflation to almost unmeasurable levels. Hyperinflation and price controls 
exacerbated the collapse of agricultural production, and there were recurrent 
shortages of even basic foods. Zimbabwe’s score on the Human Development 
Index fell from more than 0.5 around 1985 to 0.345 in 2008, and its ranking fell 
from 35th place in 1989, to 71st in 2002, to 151st (out of 177 countries) in 2009.5  
Life expectancy fell by one-quarter, teachers, doctors and nurses were paid 
irregularly, and cholera broke out in late 2008. Stabilising the economy and 
restoring economic growth were pre-requisites for any substantial social policy 
reforms. Given that a ZANU-PF government could not borrow internationally, it 
had little choice but to cede some power to the MDC (Matyszak, 2010).  
 
Hunger and malnutrition became ever more widespread, especially in rural areas. 
Between 1995 and 2003, the proportion of the population living below the Food 
Poverty Line – i.e. who could not meet their basic food needs – rose from 29 
percent to 58 percent (Zimbabwe, 2012: 10). Conditions worsened in the mid-
2000s. As many as 7 million people – or more than one half of the population – 
received food aid during 2008, mostly during the peak hunger period of November 
through March. Hunger affected not only ‘labour-constrained’ households – those 
comprising only the elderly, the inform or disabled, or children, often as a 
consequence of AIDS – but also households with able-bodied adults who were 
unable to support themselves through either subsistence agriculture or wage labour. 
 
In the 1990s, the ZANU-PF government had produced plans to mitigate poverty – 
including the 1995 Poverty Alleviation Action Plan (PAAP) – and there was even 
talk of a National Social Protection Strategy as late as 2000. In 2004 it produced a 
National Action Plan for Orphans and Vulnerable Children. But public policy 
revolved around discretionary, non-programmatic interventions to achieve partisan 
political ends. ZANU-PF presided over massive land reform and directed 
considerable resources to supposed war veterans. When drought recurred from 
2002, the ZANU-PF government initially spent heavily on drought-relief food aid. 
As conditions worsened, it slowly ceded control over food aid to donors. By 2009, 
huge numbers of poor Zimbabweans were dependent on donor-provided food aid or 
remittances sent by kin living abroad. 
																																								 																				
5 http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/Country-Profiles/ZWE.pdf.  






War veterans were integral to land reform, and benefitted in other ways also. At 
independence, about one-third of the former guerrillas were incorporated into the 
new army, whilst the majority were demobilised and paid a small salary for two 
years. Veterans later formed an association and demanded land and welfare 
benefits. Mugabe first conceded discretionary payments for ‘disability’. The scope 
of ‘disability’ slowly widened, from physical disability to any supposed post-
traumatic stress. The Veterans Association leadership reportedly rubber-stamped 
applications without any medical examinations. Senior politicians – including 
Mercedes-driving senior ministers – received massive disability awards. “Millions 
of dollars were siphoned off into the hands of the ruling elite” (Alexander, 2009: 
190). In the face of intense protests by the Veterans Association, Mugabe conceded 
in 1997 a lump-sum payment and monthly pensions to all veterans, as well as 
health care and education benefits and the promise of land. Continued protests led 
to pensions being repeatedly increased. The protests and their success led to 
veterans becoming a coherent and powerful force, thereafter serving rather than 
defying the ZANU-PF leadership (Krieger, 2005; Alexander & McGregor, 2006). 
The cost of meeting these unbudgeted commitments to veterans imposed severe 
strains on public finances, triggered the collapse of the currency and contributed 
significantly to Zimbabwe’s economic decline (Alexander, 2009: 191). 
 
Land reform combined with drought in the early 2000s to generate a deepening 
agricultural crisis. Droughts had affected Zimbabwe regularly since independence, 
and a clear pattern had become visible in the state responses. “Mugabe’s adoption 
of drought relief programs reflected his own political strength or weakness, shifting 
as his standing changed”, writes Munemo of the period up to 2004 (2012: 88; also 
Munro, 2003). During the period of ZANU-PF hegemony from the mid-1980s to 
the late 1990s, the government had responded to drought with food-for-work and 
school feeding programmes, which earned praise internationally. In the changed 
political conditions of the early 2000s, the state shifted to the discretionary 
distribution of food aid, which could be more easily controlled by war veterans for 
partisan purposes. The deepening economic crisis soon meant, however, that the 
state could not cope with the need for food, and the government was forced to turn 
to the WFP in 2002. In 2004, for political effect, Mugabe expelled the WFP (and 
other foreign food aid organisations), on the (mistaken) grounds that the drought 
had broken and the harvest was sufficient to meet the country’s needs. This allowed 
Mugabe to reward supporters and punish opponents in the run-up to the March 
2005 elections (ibid: 87, 118-9). 
 
After winning the 2005 elections, ZANU-PF had to allow the WFP to return and 
resume its food aid distribution. In 2006, WFP distributed 183,000 metric tons of 






food to 4.4 million beneficiaries. In 2007, it delivered slightly less food (147,000 
tons) but to more than 5.5 million beneficiaries. In 2008, a massive 217,000 tons 
were distributed to nearly 7 million people (WFP, 2012a: 6). The supposed enemies 
of Zimbabwe – i.e. the USA, UK and EU – were getting basic foodstuffs to 
between 30 and 50 percent of the population, via the United Nations and NGOs 
(Bourne, 2011: 212). In effect, foreign donors and local NGOs became a surrogate 
state during the 2000s (Munemo, 2009: 100). The WFP later reported that the 
ZANU-PF government tolerated WFP interventions only “when the magnitude of 
the national food shortages far exceeded government’s capacity” to provide 
emergency food aid. When food shortages diminished, the ZANU-PF government 
downplayed the need, and portrayed its land reforms and other policies as 
successful. “At times during 2006-2008 period, food aid would even be condemned 
in public meetings, especially by top politicians citing that it perpetuated and 
created a dependency syndrome” (WFP, 2012a: 16). Although the state was unable 
to provide food aid, it sought to use its distribution for political purposes. In rural 
areas, war veterans sought to ensure that the NGOs responsible for administering 
WFP food aid registered only ZANU-PF-approved beneficiaries.6   
 
Whilst large sums were spent on drought relief by the state, at least until the early 
2000s, and by donors thereafter, very little was spent on general social assistance 
programmes. The parsimonious core of social assistance was Public Assistance, 
administered by the Department of Social Welfare, which dated from pre-
independence relief for poor people along the lines of colonial “poor laws” 
(Kaseke, 1988). The 1988 Social Welfare Assistance Act limited Public Assistance 
to people who were destitute, unable to work for a living, either elderly (over 65 
years of age) or disabled or chronically ill, and without kin who could look after 
them. Many – perhaps half – of public assistance recipients were elderly people of 
foreign origins who had no kin in Zimbabwe who could support them. Cash 
benefits were very parsimonious. In 1999, adults received cash allowances of up to 
Z$100 per month, which corresponded to one-third or less of the poverty line 
(although beneficiaries also received free medical treatment and dependent children 
were exempted from school and exam fees, and urban beneficiaries might have 
their rent and utility bills paid). Much of the cash grant was sometimes spent on 
travelling to collect it. In the mid-1990s, allowances were paid to between 15,000 
and 70,000 people, at a total cost of about 0.0001% of GDP, i.e. a small fraction of 
																																								 																				
6 One of the authors (Chinyoka) was a team leader in Manicaland from 2005 to 2008, employed 
by the Irish NGO GOAL International to register food aid beneficiaries. In some areas 
beneficiary registration had to be repeated three times in order to circumvent ZANU-PF 
manipulation. 






what was spent on drought relief programmes was spent on a tiny proportion of the 
poor population (Munro, 2003). The adoption of a National Action Plan for 
Orphans and Vulnerable Children in 2004 suggested that social assistance 
programmes might be extended in response to the AIDS crisis. But the state’s role 
was largely one of supposed co-ordination, whilst local NGOs spent foreign donor 
funds through a multi-donor fund (the ‘Programme of Support’) managed by 
UNICEF. As was the case with drought relief, donors had assumed many of the 
functions of the welfare state by 2008. 
 
By the time the MDC joined ZANU-PF in government in early 2009, the state had 
largely handed over both its drought relief activities and its meagre efforts to 
support destitute people (including orphans) to donors and NGOs. The state not 
only ceased to fund drought relief or any other poverty relief, but it also lost the 
capacity to do so. The Department of Social Services was “extremely understaffed 
and underfinanced”, with “a 39 percent vacancy rate in the most critical front-line 
staff in charge of coordinating humanitarian assistance at the district level” 
(according to the WFP). “The decline in government capacity” had “also crippled 
the delivery of other critical social protection mechanisms”, including Public 
Assistance, health and school fee waivers, and public works programmes (WFP, 
2012a: 5). Because of ZANU-PF’s politics – and its policies which were directly 
responsible for the economic crisis – donors were unwilling to fund the 
government’s general operating budget, unlike in other poor Southern African 
countries. ZANU-PF was suspicious of foreign and local NGOs, and sought to 
control them. 
 
Under ZANU-PF, Zimbabwe became an example of what Gough et al. (2004) 
called “insecurity regimes”, i.e. cases where predatory governments actively 
undermined the welfare of their citizens. As late as the 1990s, “insecurity regimes” 
were widespread in Africa, but in the 2000s the combination of democratisation 
and the changing priorities of donors and international agencies resulted in the 
expansion of public education, health care and cash transfer programmes across 
much of Africa (Garcia & Moore, 2012). In the early and mid-2000s, Zimbabwe 
was an exception to the general picture of policy reform or at least experimentation 
with pilot programmes. In several other countries in the region political elites were 
ambivalent about cash transfer to poor people (see Kabandula & Seekings, 2016, 
on Zambia, and Kalebe-Nyamongo & Marquette, 2014, and Hamer, 2016, on 










The MDC and Policy Reform, 2009-2013 
 
In 2009 the MDC was ten years old. It had a solid core of experienced MPs (many 
of whom had been elected first in 2000). Its constitution – adopted formally at the 
party’s inaugural congress in 2000 – identified the MDC as a “social democratic 
party” whose core values included solidarity, justice and equality.7 The constitution 
committed the MDC to “a mixed market economy with a strong social conscience”, 
“a just society in which the weak and the poor are assured of a decent standard of 
living and equitable social services such as health and education and in which equal 
opportunities are available to all people”, and “a fair and equitable distribution of 
land”. After the MDC split into two factions in 2005, the larger MDC-T faction 
held a second national congress in March 2006. MDC-T reiterated that the party 
was “a social democratic movement and as such our policies will reflect our 
commitment to the welfare of our people and the development of our country”, and 
promised a “full policy review”.8 Prior to the 2008 elections the MDC published a 
180-page document setting out its proposed economic, social and political policies 
(MDC, 2008) – a shorter, 33-page version was published as the party’s election 
manifesto. The MDC thus went to great lengths to present itself as the 
programmatic antithesis to the patronage-dispensing ZANU-PF.  
 
The MDC’s origins were in the labour movement (the Zimbabwe Congress of 
Trade Unions, ZCTU) and the civic and constitutional movement that came 
together in the National Constitutional Assembly) in the late 1990s (Raftopoulos, 
2000; Hudleston, 2005; LeBas, 2011). Its support was strongest in urban areas. Its 
policies have been described as reflecting a mix of the left-orientated rhetoric 
aimed at urban workers and the “neo-liberal economics” favoured by landowners, 
multilateral and Western donors (Chung, 2010). All of these characteristics are 
typical of social democratic parties. 
 
Given the political and economic crisis facing Zimbabwe, the MDC’s 2008 policy 
document unsurprisingly focused primarily on governance and economic 
stabilization and reconstruction. The document did include also, however, an 
extended discussion of “social issues”. The MDC proclaimed that “everyone has 
the right to a just job and to a decent living”. “The challenge facing the MDC as a 
social democratic party will be to democratize and internalize growth through 
economic empowerment while enhancing the capabilities of the individuals who 
																																								 																				
7 At its 2011 Congress, the MDC added that it was a ‘pro-poor, people-centred social democratic 
movement’. 
8 http://www.thezimbabwean.co/news/7881/mdc-towards-congress-2006.html.  






make up the nation’s workforce”. The MDC promised a “social contract” between 
labour, employers and the state, and “tripartite consultations on all matters affecting 
the management of the economy, the promotion of economic growth and 
development, the operations of the labour market and the provision of a 
comprehensive social security net”. This “social contract” would be overseen by a 
tripartite National Social and Economic Council. With regard to social security, the 
MDC’s vision was that “the retired, the disadvantaged and the poor will live with 
dignity and security”. The MDC promised to resuscitate pension schemes for 
working people and to put in place “safety nets” for “the disadvantaged and the 
absolute poor so as to help them meet their daily lives” as well as “women, 
children, the disabled and the aged”. An MDC government would “give 
consideration to a national per capita grant to assist low-income families with their 
basic needs” as well as a “special grant system to help families with the cost of 
supporting orphans”. The policy document seems to promise universal pensions, in 
that it proclaims that “non-contributory pension rights will be extended to all who 
have no rights at present, and these were to be paid and supported directly by the 
ministry”. The MDC also referred to a national but voluntary system of 
contributory medical aid and a school nutrition programme (MDC, 2008: 95-104). 
 
In election rallies, Tsvangirai focused on good political and economic governance, 
which would end shortages of food and other basic commodities, control inflation 
and restore economic growth. The revitalization of public services featured 
prominently.9 ZANU-PF also promised reforms of agricultural policy, housing and 
education (including helping the poor with school fees), but in contrast to the MDC 
it emphasized the indigenisation of foreign-owned companies, and fighting 
sanctions and British imperialism. 
 
Whilst the MDC’s policy document was not explicit on what precisely would be 
done to stabilize the economy, pro-MDC donors began to plan even before the 
elections, forming an Analytic Multi-Donors Trust Fund (or A-MDTF) and seven 
Technical Review Groups (one examining Social Protection), as well as 
commissioning sixteen policy studies (including a Social Protection Baseline 
Study). The A-MDTF, led by the World Bank, helped to draft a Zimbabwe 
Emergency Recovery Program (ZERP), the second draft of which was completed 
in September 2008. ZERP emphasized economic recovery, including in agriculture 
																																								 																				
9 See reports on the election campaign launch in Mutare (Caiphas Chimhete, ‘Tsvangirai still has 
“it”’, Zimbabwe Situation, 9 March 2008; http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/mar9a_2008.html) 
and rallies in Murehwa (International Herald Tribune, 26th March, 2008) and Harare (Mail and 
Guardian, 24th March, 2008; Voice of Africa, 23rd March, 2008). 






and infrastructure, but it also outlined “a package of measures needed in the early 
period of stabilization to protect the poor unable to benefit from the resulting 
economic growth”, including “self-targeting public works for the able-bodied poor” 
(paying either in food or cash) and “targeted direct transfers … for the vulnerable 
who cannot work” (MDTF, 2008: 13). In line with the developmental thinking that 
predominated within the World Bank, ZERP emphasized that “the Social 
Protection strategy is to make safety nets supportive of growth rather than using 
them as handouts that create dependency” (ibid: 2008: 5). In early 2009, following 
dollarization and the new GNU’s announcement of a Short-Term Emergency 
Recovery Programme, major donors met in Washington DC and agreed to establish 
a larger MDTF to channel substantial aid to Zimbabwe in support of the GNU’s 
programmes. Separate ‘Transitional Funds’ were later established for the 
Education, Health and Child Protection (and one was proposed for Older Persons). 
 
MDC ministers succeeded in ending hyperinflation, stabilizing the economy, and 
even securing real economic growth of 10 percent by 2013.10 Wages improved and 
food became more readily available. But economic recovery remained constrained 
by the continued political volatility and instability, agricultural production was 
insufficient to meet people’s needs, and acute poverty persisted. There was a clear 
need for programmes to address immediate poverty and hunger as well as to 
increase agricultural production. 
 
The key ministry in this was the Ministry of Labour and Social Services, which 
oversaw the separate departments of Social Services and Labour. The Minister was 
Paurina Mpariwa-Gwanyanya, the long-standing MDC-T MP for the Harare 
constituency of Mufakose. The deputy-minister was Tracy Mutinhiri, ZANU-PF 
MP for Marondera East, and Political Commissar of the ZANU-PF Women’s 
League. Accused of voting for the MDC candidate in elections for the Speaker of 
Parliament in March 2011, and of generally being too close to the MDC, Mutinhiri 
was forced into hiding and her farm was attacked (ironically, given that she herself 
had acquired the farm through a land invasion in 2002). She was later expelled 
from ZANU-PF, and joined MDC-T.11 Mpariwa was fortunate in working with an 
																																								 																				
10 ‘Zimbabwe’s economy during the life of the coalition government’, NewsDay 5th September 
2013; https://www.newsday.co.zw/2013/09/05/zimbabwes-economy-life-coalition-goverment/. 
11 ‘Tracy Mutinhiri and her family remained in hiding’, The Zimbabwean, 5th April, 2011. 
http://www.thezimbabwean.co/news/38657/tracy-mutinhiri-and-her-family-remained-in-
hiding.html. ‘Transcript of Tracy Mutinhiri on Question Time’, The Zimbabwean, 8th June 2012: 
http://www.thezimbabwean.co/news/zimbabwe/58737/transcript-of-tracy-mutinhiri-on.html. 
‘MDC embraces Mutinhiri’, The Zimbabwean, 3rd October, 2012, 






unusually cooperative ZANU-PF deputy-minister,12 at least until March 2012, 
when Mutinhiri was replaced by Monica Mutsvangwa. But, like most other MDC 
ministers, she inherited officials appointed by ZANU-PF. The Permanent 
Secretary, Lancester Museka, was appointed directly by the President, Mugabe, and 
the Director of Social Services, Sydney Mhishi – who was primarily responsible for 
liaison with NGOs – was a known ZANU-PF loyalist. 
 
Much of the energy of the Ministry between 2009 and 2013 was taken up with 
labour issues (falling under the Department of Labour). The ministry succeeded in 
revising Zimbabwe’s labour laws, established a tripartite board to negotiate 
working conditions of government employees, and returned Zimbabwe to 
international organisations such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO).13 
Social protection policy reforms were driven more by the donors and international 
agencies, organized through the Social Protection Technical Reference Group, 
linked to the MDTF. Donors commissioned a flurry of reports on social protection 
in Zimbabwe (Gandure, 2009; Wallace-Karenga & Mutiheru, 2009; Munemo, 
2009; Chitambara, 2010). They combined with government officials in a National 
Social Protection Consultative Forum,14 and together went on to produce three key 
strategy documents: A new Food Deficit Mitigation Strategy through Public Works 
(July 2010), a National Action Plan for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (NAP for 
OVC) Phase II (September 2011) and a National Social Transfers Policy 
Framework (drafted in 2011 and finalized in September 2012). 
 
The new National Social Transfers Policy Framework, drafted primarily by 
UNICEF, provided a very general vision or statement of intent elaborating on the 
general proposals sketched out in the ZERP drafted by donors in 2008. In her 
foreword, the Minister (Mpariwa) emphasized the imperative of harmonizing the 
efforts of donors, local NGOs and the state. The document itself envisaged 
statutory cash transfers to selected ‘labour-constrained’ groups, productive public 
works and means-tested agricultural support for able-bodied adults, and means-
tested cash transfers for any other indigent people. An inter-ministerial National 
Steering Committee on Social Transfers would be established to supervise 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
http://www.thezimbabwean.co/news/zimbabwe/61267/mdc-embraces-mutinhiri.html. All 
accessed 27th May 2014. 
12 In an interview, Mpariwa-Gwanyanya suggested that it was the good working relationship that 
had attracted Mutinhiri to the MDC-T: interview, Harare, 27th February 2015. All interviews 
cited in this paper were conducted by Isaac Chinyoka. 
13 Interview with Mpariwa; see also ‘Mpariwa: A veteran of the struggle’, The Zimbabwean 27th 
February 2013; http://www.thezimbabwean.co/2013/02/mpariwa-a-veteran-of-the/.  
14 Interview with Solomon Mutambara  (Mercy Corps M&E Manager), Harare, 6th January 2015. 






implementation, with actual implementation being done by the Ministry of Labour 
and Social Services). The document provided little detail (Zimbabwe, 2012). What 
it did was to register cash transfer programmes as one component in the MDC and 
GNU’s policy package, and to insist on some overall coordination (in contrast to 
the practice in the past – see Kaseke, 2003). Interviewees say that the impetus to 
this planning arose in part from donors’ response to the Zimbabwean government’s 
requests for money: Donors would insist that the GNU provided a plan before they 
would fund programmes.15 
 
The MDC (and hence GNU) was more enthusiastic about cash transfer programmes 
than ZANU-PF, but it also favoured a primarily developmental approach. The 
overarching priority was to promote agricultural production and job-creating 
economic growth, so that people could sustain themselves. Cash transfers were a 
short-term necessity – and perhaps a longer-tem necessity for specific groups of 
people – that required economic growth to be sustainable.16 MDC leaders 
articulated the concerns over ‘dependency’ – both of poor people on ‘handouts’ and 
of Zimbabwe as a whole on donors – that were widespread among political elites 
across Southern Africa – and within some international agencies, notably the World 
Bank. Even among the very poor, livelihood support programmes – including 
subsidized agricultural inputs – were crucial to boost agricultural production.17 The 
GNU’s new Food Deficit Mitigation Strategy through Public Works (June 2010) 
proposed programmes to shift “from free handouts to more market-friendly 
mechanisms that rebuild people’s livelihoods and promote self-reliance rather than 
perpetuate the culture of dependency” (WFP, 2012a: 15-16).  
 
There was significant reform even with respect to smallholder agriculture. Donors 
had established a Protracted Relief Programme (PRP) in 2004 to improve food 
security through increased smallholder production. Amidst partial political and 
economic stabilization, donors established PRP II, with the immediate goal of 
reaching more than 2 million people through improved agricultural and livestock 
productivity. Livelihood support programmes provided resources to poor 
households in order to help them to work themselves out of poverty. The resources 
provided included agricultural inputs, vouchers and cash – the latter made possible 
again by dollarization. While emergency aid was short term, livelihood assistance 
was given for one or two years, after which beneficiary households were supposed 
																																								 																				
15 Interview with Sydney Mhishi, Gweru, 4th December 2014. 
16 Interview with Tendai Biti, MDC MP and former Minister of Finance, Harare, 26th February 
2015. 
17 Interview with Biti. 






to “graduate” (Schubert, 2011:10). This was funded by the FAO, and reached a 
total of 1.87 million beneficiaries over the three years 2009/10-2011/12, compared 
with 1.34 million over the preceding three years.18 
 
Reform was far more dramatic in two other key areas: Emergency support for poor 
households that were unable to feed themselves, and support for ‘labour-
constrained’ households that were chronically unable to earn a living. 
 
 
From famine relief to public works programmes 
and cash transfers 
 
Across much of Africa social protection programmes evolved out of drought and 
famine relief activities. In Botswana – a country especially vulnerable to drought – 
late colonial emergency became institutionalised after independence in the 
country’s five-year plans, with ad hoc aid being replaced by ongoing public 
employment programmes (Munemo, 2012; Seekings, 2016). In Zimbabwe, ZANU-
PF’s political weaknesses inhibited any such programmatisation within the state, 
although donors ran massive programmes. Under the GNU, for the first time, 
donors and state worked together, transforming public policy. 
 
As of 2009, food aid provided through the WFP comprised by far the largest form 
of social protection in terms of either cost or the number of beneficiaries. Hitherto, 
most food aid was distributed without conditions, some through schools but mostly 
under the WFP’s Vulnerable Group Feeding Programme. After 2009, “WFP and its 
partners shifted from large-scale, in kind food aid to a more flexible and responsive 
programme” (WFP, 2012a: 6). The WFP shifted food aid into productive Food (or 
Cash) for Work programmes, which evolved into ‘Productive Asset Creation’ 
schemes (called Food- and Cash-for-Assets programmes). The WFP also 
experimented with direct cash transfers through the Zimbabwe Emergency Cash 
Transfer.19 
 
This shift was premised on partial political as well as economic stabilisation, and in 
turn it facilitated cooperation between state and NGOs. The WFP later reported that 
																																								 																				
18 ‘Donor-Funded Agricultural Support Programmes: Impact Analysis of the 2004-2012 
Agricultural Input Assistance Programmes in Zimbabwe’; http://www.slideserve.com/ruth-
vaughan/donor-funded-agricultural-support-programmes.  
19 Interviews with Herbert Matsikwa (WFP Programme Officer) and Sherita Manyika (WFP 
Programme Assistant), Harare, 15th January 2015. 






relations with the government improved from March 2009, with the government 
taking ‘greater ownership’ of food relief. First, whereas ZANU-PF had largely 
denied the existence of poverty, the MDC institutionalized the ‘ZimVAC’ food 
security assessment process in the Department of Finance, and the results were 
discussed and approved through the cabinet. This guided donor resource allocation. 
Secondly, the shift from general food aid to new, specific programmes entailed 
greater government ownership (WFP, 2012a: 16). 
 
The bulk of aid continued to be provided in kind. The WFP distributed a total of 
342,000 tons of food aid in 2008, and a further 244,000 tons in 2009. In 2010, the 
volume distributed fell to 83,000 tons, to 46,000 tons in 2011 and 37,000 tons in 
2012.20 The total number of reported beneficiaries was 7 million in 2008 and 5.3 
million in 2009, but only 1.8 million in 2010. Over the 32 months between May 
2008 and the end of 2010, the WFP spent US$600 million on food, mostly on the 
Vulnerable Group Feeding Programme, as well as $2 million distributed as cash 
transfers (WFP, 2012a: 8, 24).  Under the Vulnerable Group Feeding Programme, 
households received a daily ration of 400g of cereal, 60g of pulses, and 20g of oil. 
Rations were distributed monthly, and only in the lean season (usually November 
to March). After 2009, delivery became less and less politicised at the local level.21 
 
The WFP and other donors were keen to shift from emergency food aid to 
programmes that helped poor people to rebuild agricultural livelihoods. This 
entailed public employment programmes, mostly providing work between April 
(harvest time) and November (the beginning of the agricultural season), in contrast 
to food aid most of which was distributed between November and March, because 
stored food supplies were exhausted. In 2008-09 the MDTF funded a preliminary 
study of the possibility of shifting to a food-for-work programme (Wallace-
Karenga & Mutihero, 2009). Late in 2009, the WFP approved a Food for Work 
programme, to be implemented by NGOs (Plan International, World Vision and 
Save the Children), community-based NGOs, local authorities and the receiving 
communities. Implementation began in mid-2010 in selected districts with a track 
record of recurrent food insecurity. In 2010 and 2011, about 20,000 households in 
Manicaland, Mashonaland Central, Masvingo and southwestern parts of the country 
received cereals, pulses and vegetable oil in return for their work on communal 
projects which included irrigation schemes, dam and well construction, repair of 
																																								 																				
20 Data from WFP, ‘Global Food Aid Deliveries’, downloaded from www.wfp.org, 28th June 
2015. 
21 One of the authors (Chinyoka) worked as an Assistant Field Manager in Midlands 
(specifically, in Gokwe South and Gokwe North districts) from 2009 to 2011, employed by 
Concern Worldwide, which was the WFP implementing partner in the area. 






school buildings, installation of dip tanks, dairy parlours, nutrition gardens and 
piggeries. In some areas, where food could be bought locally, beneficiaries 
received cash instead of food rations.22 In 2011, this evolved into a ‘Productive 
Asset Creation’ programme, under which food or cash were provided to people 
creating or rehabilitating ‘assets’ such as irrigation schemes, dams, dip tanks, 
community gardens, roads and bridges. The WFP itself presented the new 
programme in the developmental terms favoured by the GNU (and World Bank): 
 
‘The Government of Zimbabwe, WFP and other partners have expressed 
concern that the continuation of food assistance without conditions will 
encourage a mind-set of dependency and will not address the underlying 
causes of household food insecurity. The Cash/Food for Asset (C/FFA) 
programme forms part of WFP’s new strategic direction, which has 
transitioned from free food distributions to supporting resilience-building 
activities. WFP’s C/FFA programme aims to empower vulnerable 
communities to move away from dependency on food assistance and 
create assets that increase their ability to handle future shocks …’ (WFP, 
2012b: 2).  
 
The pilot project began in August 2011 in nine districts, and by 2013 was being 
implemented in 22 districts, benefitting 40,000 households directly (and, WFP 
argued, many more indirectly). The government itself though along similar lines, 
but lacked resources to implement reforms.23 In 2009, it asked the World Bank to 
fund a cash-for-work programme that would pay $20 cash for 15 days of labour on 
a public works programme, for approximately 280,000 vulnerable households 
countrywide (Wallace-Karenga & Mutiheru, 2009: 11). In November 2011, rural 
district councils and ‘communities’ in two Midlands districts began to identify 
projects and select people for ‘community productive works teams’, with tools and 
food rations funded by the World Bank. The programme was supposed to roll out 
countrywide.24 The World Bank also funded capacity-building within the 
Department of Social Services, through the establishment of a ‘Project 
Implementation Support Unit’. 
 
																																								 																				
22 The Zimbabwean, 26th March 2012; 
http://www.thezimbabwean.co/news/zimbabwe/57290/food-for-work-does-it.html. 
23 Interview with Ruth Wutete (Social Protection Specialist, World Bank Zimbabwe), Harare, 
11th November 2014. 
24 According to the programme’s national coordinator, Moses Chourombo, The Zimbabwean, 26th 
March 2012. 






The WFP also experimented with cash transfers from 2009. Cash transfers had 
been briefly piloted in the mid-2000s, as part of the Protracted Relief Programme 
(which had transferred cash to HIV/AIDS infected and affected households from 
2004: see Gourlay, 2012, and below) and separately. These experiments had been 
very short-lived, because hyperinflation and the unavailability of food meant that 
cash was of limited value. When financial and economic markets stabilized in early 
2009, more cash- and marketed-oriented program solutions also became possible 
(WFP, 2012a: 20-21). Some targeted districts were close to districts that were 
producing food surpluses, and where farmers and millers were beginning to build 
up stocks of maize. In November 2009 the WFP launched a pilot Zimbabwe 
Emergency Cash Transfer programme (also known as the Cash-for-Cereal 
programme) in selected wards in the Gokwe North, Gokwe South and Nyanga 
districts.25 The wards where the pilot was implemented were selected specifically 
on the basis that they were adjacent to districts producing an agricultural surplus. 
The Emergency Cash Transfer programme covered only a small proportion (10 
percent) of the poor, which placed strain on the partnership of local leaders and 
outside donors (although, WFP claimed, the pilot programme was not politicized). 
The pilot reached about 60,000 households (WFP, 2012a). The success of the pilot, 
which was run by Concern Worldwide and ran until March 2010, led to the WFP 
including a cash component for all recipients in its flagship Vulnerable Group 
Feeding Programme in 2010-11 (Concern Worldwide, 2011). 
 
The shift from food aid to cash transfers was slow and, in large part, externally-
driven. As the WFP itself later reported, “the piloting of cash transfers and 
introduction of an e-voucher system (as alternatives to direct food transfers) in 
Zimbabwe, was inspired to some extent by the shift in WFP’s corporate policy and 
strategy” noted in the WFP Strategic Plan 2008-13 (WFP, 2011; 2012a: 21). As the 
GNU’s own Food Mitigation Deficit Strategy and cash-for-work programme 
showed, however, the GNU was shifting broadly in line with the donors, with state 
and donor-run programmes run along similar lines and with similar goals, in 
contrast with the situation prior to 2009. 
 
 
Support for ‘labour-constrained’ households 
 
Food-for-work programmes could not help ‘labour-constrained’ households 
without able-bodied adult members. Historically, Public Assistance targeted such 
households, but the benefits were low and coverage was minimal. AIDS resulted in 
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rising numbers of orphans – variously estimated between 1 and 1.7 million 
(Mushunje & Mafico, 2010; Masuka et al., 2012). In 2004 the ZANU-PF 
government had approved a National Action Plan for Orphans and Vulnerable 
Children, under which the Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM) paid 
school fees for ‘vulnerable’ children. But BEAM had atrophied in the mid-2000s, 
and the ZANU-PF government was uninterested in other programmes. AIDS also 
combined with social change to leave growing numbers of elderly people without 
kin to support them (whilst hyperinflation destroyed any savings they might have 
had).  
 
In 2011 the GNU approved a new National Action Plan (NAP) for Orphans and 
Vulnerable Children (OVCs). Whereas ‘NAP I’ had focused on children, ‘NAP II’ 
focused on families as well as children. It provided for three kinds of programme to 
be funded through a multi-donor Child Protection Fund: a national cash transfer 
programme targeting food-poor, labour-constrained households; improved access 
to child protection services; and improved access to basic education for poor 
orphans and other vulnerable children (primarily through a renewal of BEAM). 
Initial financial support from UNICEF assisted 514,000 OVCs (UNICEF, 2011). In 
2012, the UK’s Department for International Development (DfID) gave US$15 
million to fund BEAM at primary level while the GNU pledged US$16 million to 
do the same at secondary level (Smith, Chiroro & Musker, 2012; DfID, 2013).  
 
The primary reform was the introduction of a Harmonised Social Cash Transfer 
(HSCT) programme, piloted in Goromonzi district in late 2010 and launched 
formally in May 2011. The HSCT programme provided benefits of between US$10 
and US$25 per month, depending on household size. HSCT would replace the 
defunct Public Assistance scheme. Ten percent of the households in each district 
would be selected, which represented a massive expansion relative to Public 
Assistance, but meant also that many very poor households would not benefit. 
Eligibility depended on two criteria. First, households had to be ‘labour-
constrained’, meaning that they had no able-bodied working-age adults or had only 
one such adult who was caring for many children or elderly or sick dependents. 
Secondly, households had to be ‘food poor’, meaning that they were unable to meet 
their most basic needs, taking only one or no meals each day and unable to 
purchase essential non-food items such as soap and clothing. Most eligible 
households included many children, but also elderly and disabled adults; most were 
headed by widows. The original intention was to expand from the initial district to 
another eight districts (and some parts of Bulawayo) as Phase I, from February 
2012, and then to another nine districts (and additional urban areas) in Phase II 
from April 2013. This would allow the programme to reach almost 90,000 






households in 2014, in two districts in each of the country’s nine provinces. By 
2015, it would be expanded to a total of 30 districts. But positive evaluations led to 
an accelerated expansion plan, with the target of 250,000 poor families in all 65 
districts – i.e. 10 percent of the Zimbabwean population – by 2015. In practice, the 
state lacked the capacity to expand this fast. Donors worked through local state 
institutions in selecting beneficiaries, but by June 2013 they had reached a total of 
only a little over 30,000 households in only 13 districts. The programme was 
funded jointly by the GNU and UNICEF (through the Child Protection Fund) 
(Schubert, 2011, 2014; Gourlay, 2012; FAO, 2013; AIR, 2013).  
 
The design of the HSCT programme reflected donors’ priorities of targeting strictly 
the poor. A key figure in the design of the programme was the German 
development expert Berndt Schubert, who had worked on targeted cash transfer 
programmes for more than twenty years, including in Mozambique, Zambia and 
Malawi. The HSCT was very similar in design to the cash transfer programmes 
piloted in Zambia in the mid-2000s. In contrast to Zambia in the mid-2000s, 
however, the Zimbabwean government – or at least the MDC ministers in the GNU 
– were now willing to embrace an ambitious rollout plan.  The HSCT was quite 
different to the ‘categorical’ cash transfer programmes in South Africa, Botswana, 
Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia. These programmes targeted specific categories 
of deserving poor – the elderly, the disabled, children – using either a generous 
means-test (that served to exclude the rich) or no means test at all (i.e. the 
programmes were universal within the specific category). Zimbabwe had, until 
independence, had an old age pension programme, as in South Africa, but unlike 
the South African programme it excluded altogether elderly African people, i.e. it 
provided pensions only to the very small minority of non-African elderly. Rather 
than extend them to all Zimbabweans, the Mugabe government at independence 
abolished them altogether (Kaseke, 1988). Whilst Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland all followed the lead of South Africa (and Namibia) in introducing old-
age pensions between 1996 and 2005, ZANU-PF governments in Zimbabwe 
anomalously continued to offer nothing beyond entirely inadequate Public 
Assistance. By 2012 many of Zimbabwe’s elderly were living in poverty. The 
HSCT marked a major reform relative to Public Assistance, but it was meagre 
relative to the cash transfer programmes of countries to the south. Lacking 
resources, even MDC ministers showed little enthusiasm for introducing an old-age 
pension (despite their 2008 promise to do so). Not were most donors and 
international agencies as keen on pensions as they were on supporting children and 
working-age adults. Only one international NGO – HelpAge International – 
showed any interest, initiating a tiny pilot programme (for 180 very old 






beneficiaries) through its local organization in Zimbabwe.26 The one thing done by 
the MDC was the resuscitation of the Older Persons Bill. This had been drafted in 
2002, and subsequently went through five more drafts, but was never finalized nor 
enacted by ZANU-PF. In September 2012, the Bill was finally enacted. The new 
Act envisaged social assistance only for disabled or destitute elderly people, i.e. 
people without kin to support them. Programmes would be financed through a joint 
government-donor Older Persons Fund. This would entail expansion beyond the 
provision of the HSCT, but would have fallen far short of the MDC’s 2008 promise 
of non-contributory old-age pensions. The Older Persons Fund had not been 
established before the end of the GNU in 2013. 
 
In comparison with countries further south, Zimbabwean politicians continued to 
emphasise the importance of family. In South Africa, Botswana and elsewhere, 
public policy recognized the decline of social and economic obligations of care and 
support of kin to kin. In Zimbabwe, a widening range of politicians recognized the 
need for some state provision for children. Even some ZANU-PF leaders sought to 
trumpet their own reformist credentials. At the launch of NAP II, ZANU-PF’s Joice 
Mujuru, at the time the Vice-President of Zimbabwe, referred to the Plan as an 
“unprecedented social protection mechanism”. Tsvangirai, for the MDC, added that 
“we are on the road to ensuring that Zimbabwe’s children, especially the most 
vulnerable, will benefit from these critical services”. Mujuru went on to explain 
that the government, through “innovative ways to increase support to orphans and 
vulnerable children”, was “reinforcing and strengthening the traditional role of 
families and communities in promoting and protecting the wellbeing of children”. 
MDC leaders did not seem to differ much, if at all, from this.27  
 
 
Conclusion: Pressures, Opportunities and 
Constraints on Policy Reform 
 
Any assessment of the period of MDC participation in government, from 2009 to 
2013, must weigh up the changes with the limits to those changes. Bratton (2014: 
129) constructs a “balance sheet”, assessing whether progress on a set of issues 
(taken from the 24 articles of the 2008 ZANU-PF/MDC agreement) entailed “full”, 
“partial” or “no” implementation. Most of the issues were political or 
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27 The Guardian, 28th September 2011; http://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2011/sep/28/zimbabwe-national-child-protection-fund. 






constitutional, and implementation was at best partial. The 2008 agreement did not 
spell out much in the way of economic and social policies. Article 3a concerned 
restoring economic stability and Article 16 concerned the depoliticisation of food 
relief programmes. In both cases, Bratton grades the implementation as ‘partial’.  
 
In most areas of economic and social policy there was clear progress during 2009-
13 compared with the period 2004-08. By 2009, the economy had collapsed, 
poverty had worsened, poor families survived through remittances from kin abroad 
and food aid brought into the country by foreign donors and the state became what 
Gough et al. (2004) would call an “insecurity” state, i.e. a state that actively 
undermines the welfare of its citizens. Resources were siphoned off to political 
elites and their allies, and there was massive displacement of people from both 
urban and rural areas. Between 2009 and 2013, in contrast, the economy stabilized, 
hunger decreased, and the state consolidated and began to expand its own 
programmes, working closely with donors and local NGOs on both existing 
programmes and innovative reforms. At the same time, progress was indeed partial. 
Continuing political crisis and the machinations of ZANU-PF continued to impede 
economic recovery and growth.  
 
Among the reforms was the shift from food aid to food (or cash)-for-work 
programmes, later transformed into food (or cash)-for-assets programmes, and cash 
transfers (sometimes known as ‘cash-for-cereal’ programmes). The state and 
donors collaborated over a new Harmonised Cash Transfer Programme that had the 
ambition of reaching the poorest 10 percent of the population. Social protection 
became an integral feature of the government’s strategic documents. Growing 
numbers received benefits in the form of food or cash, and possibly larger numbers 
benefitted indirectly from the investments in infrastructure. These reforms were 
important, but partial. Most beneficiaries of state or donor programmes continued 
to receive benefits in the older forms: as food aid, or through subsidized school 
fees.  
 
These policy reforms required and helped to drive changes in the state itself. The 
decline in welfare state capacity was not only stopped but reversed. In many 
respects, Zimbabwe came to resemble more closely some of its neighbours in 
Southern Africa, with a variety of programmes and nascent elite interest in reform. 
The GNU’s priority was developmental, with the primary emphasis within social 
protection being placed on public works programmes, helping poor people to help 
themselves during periods of insufficient agricultural production. This was, 
however, supplemented with a cash transfer programme targeted on very poor 
households that were unable to benefit from public works programmes because no 






one in the household was fit for work. Whereas successive Zambian and Malawian 
governments had dragged their heels on expanding such cash transfer programmes 
beyond their pilot phase, the GNU in Zimbabwe planned to roll it out countrywide 
within five years, by the end of 2015. Like Zambia and Malawi, Zimbabwe under 
the GNU declined to introduce the ‘categorical’ programmes for the elderly, 
disabled or children that existed in South Africa and other countries in the region. 
For all its social democratic pretensions, the MDC remained deeply skeptical about 
‘handouts’ and supportive of an essentially agrarian strategy. The MDC might 
appear ‘social democratic’ relative to ZANU-PF, but not by comparison with more 
statist governments elsewhere in the region. Repeated concerns about ‘dependency’ 
on ‘handouts’ revealed the conservatism of much of the MDC leadership. 
 
Why were reforms so limited? Obvious candidates include fiscal, political and 
bureaucratic obstructionism and incompetence. Financially, ZANU-PF operated 
what was in effect a parallel government, controlling the key resource of mining 
revenues, and withholding these from the Ministry of Finance.28 Without stronger 
public finances, it is difficult to imagine how much more MDC-led ministries 
might have done. The MDC did, however, have de facto access to the substantial 
sums brought in by donors and international agencies, mostly into the Transitional 
Funds that were managed by donors but allocated by the relevant ministry.29 
Politically and organisationally, MDC ministers faced the challenge of working 
with Permanent Secretaries appointed by Mugabe. ‘All PSs in all ministries are 
thus ZANU PF loyalists, causing no little difficulty for the MDC ministers’ 
(Matyszak, 2010: 100). As Primorac & Chan (2010) conclude, the GNU was a 
coalition of very unequal parts. 
 
Another explanation points to the character of the MDC itself. Not only was it 
fatally divided into two factions – a division that may have cost Tsvangirai a first 
round victory in the 2008 presidential election – but its lack of ministerial 
experience prompted some critics to claim that the MDC simply had ‘no clue’ 
(Nkomo, 2011). Social protection policy reforms were driven by donors, not by the 
MDC itself. Donors drafted strategy documents, formulated the detail of proposed 
programmes, and largely funded and drove implementation. In some respects, 
UNICEF (for example) operated almost as a ‘shadow government’. 
 
																																								 																				
28 Interviews with Biti and with Lucia Matibenga (former MDC Minister of Public Service), 
Harare, 24th February 2015; see also Moore, Kriger and Raftopoulos (2013). 
29 Interview with Biti; see also Biti (2015). 






In the Zimbabwean case, competitive elections and an ensuing partial change of 
government certainly resulted in policy reform. This, however, was not primarily 
due to the fact that the MDC entered government with a clear set of programmatic 
commitments that distinguished it from ZANU-PF. Rather, it was because the 
MDC and donors could work together in ways that were impossible for ZANU-PF 
and donors. What the partial capture of state power by the former opposition party 
achieved in Zimbabwe was the opening of doors between donors and the state, so 
that they could collaborate on policy reform. Donors’ own concerns informed 
policy-making: Their concern to wind down food aid, to shift resources to 
productive programmes, and to experiment with cash transfer programmes, all 
reflected the international policy agenda as much as conditions within Zimbabwe 
specifically.  
 
In June 2013, new presidential and parliamentary elections were held. In what 
Bratton calls “a crushing defeat” for the MDC, Mugabe officially won 61 percent 
of the vote and ZANU-PF inflicted won 160 out of 210 parliamentary seats. 
ZANU-PF had “out-foxed, out-organized, and out-muscled a well-meaning but 
inexperienced popular opposition movement” (Bratton, 2014: 1). ZANU-PF 
mobilized effectively its own supporters and suppressed the vote for the MDC, 
including through manipulation of the electoral machinery. Massive irregularities 
inflated the ZANU-PF’s victory, but it is possible that ZANU-PF would have won 
even a free and fair election (ibid: 180-6). ZANU-PF’s strong organization and 
purposive campaigning (including intimidation) contrasted with the widespread 
disorganization, disunity and strategic indirection of the MDC factions 
(Raftopoulos, 2013b; Tendi, 2013; Zamchiya, 2013). Gallagher (2015) suggests 
also that voters may have become accustomed to political violence, with many 
“reconnecting” with ZANU-PF because of both its distribution of gifts and its 
assertive nationalism, especially on the issues of land, race and liberation. It was 
ZANU-PF that was able to deploy the “politics of provision”: 
 
‘Being able to access resources is an important issue for Zimbabweans, 
partly because of their own need to survive and flourish, and partly too 
because of the way it embodies their expectation of government as a 
provider and carer – many looked for the candidate who gives caps to 
everyone in the community, the MP who attends funerals or takes your 
sick child to hospital, the government that ensures your region has its 












‘The MDC parties were described as selfish, uncaring and detached, 
unsuccessful in government, and unable to deliver. Their values were out 
of reach, impractical and failed to embody the essence of Zimbabwe. 
Their leaders, tarnished by incompetence, corruption or venality, had lost 
authority. Crucially, the parties’ lack of clarity about what they stood for 
had become a liability …’ (ibid: 45). 
 
Gallagher concludes that Zimbabweans chose a state that was simultaneously “bad” 
(characterised by “violent prebendalism and patronage”) and “good” (“a welfare 
state that understands and embodies collective identity”) (ibid: 47).  
 
Clearly the MDC failed to be credited with its slow rebuilding of the country’s 
welfare state in terms of public education, health care and social protection, or 
agricultural support. In Gallagher’s account, it was ZANU-PF that assumed a 
somewhat progressive mantle, through electoral patronage, nationalist rhetoric and 
perhaps also land allocation. This might appear ironic, given that MDC ministers in 
the GNU presided over important policy reforms. But it is less ironic when one 
recognizes that the policy reforms were driven more by donors and international 
agencies than they were by the MDC itself, which – at least with respect to social 
protection – never backed up the progressive rhetoric of its 2008 policy document 
and manifesto with any apparent substantive commitment to reform.  
 
In Bratton’s analysis, the newly-re-elected ZANU-PF government “appeared to 
have little to offer other than an unchecked return to economic folly, elite 
corruption, and the bitter politics of exclusion” (Bratton, 2014: 2). This was not 
entirely true of social protection policy. The new ZANU-PF government has 
slowed down but not reversed the reforms of the GNU. The further rollout of the 
HSCT programme was halted, but existing beneficiaries in participating districts 
continued to receive benefits, courtesy of donors. The government assumed 
responsibility for some programmes (notably the school fee subsidy programme 
BEAM). The relationship between ZANU-PF ministries and donors became more 
difficult than with MDC-run ministries under the GNU, but did not return to their 
pre-2009 hostility – perhaps because of a general concern on the part of the ZANU-
PF government to re-engage with the West (Raftopoulos, 2014). In terms of social 
protection policy, it seems that the partial change of government in 2009 had 
enduring effects, even if these were curtailed after 2013. 
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